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This paper relies on a simple framework to understand 
the gender wage gap in Macedonia, and simulates how 
the gender wage gap would behave after the introduction 
of a minimum wage. First, it presents a new—albeit 
simple—decomposition of the wage gap into three 
factors: (i) a wage level factor, which measures the extent 
to which the gender gap is driven by differences in wage 
levels among low-skilled workers of opposite sex; (ii) a 
skills endowment factor, which quantifies the extent to 
which the gender wage gap is driven by the difference 
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in the share of high-skilled workers by gender; and (iii) 
returns to education, which measures the extent to which 
the gender gap is driven by differences by gender in 
returns to education. Second, the paper presents simple 
set of simulations that indicate that the introduction 
of a minimum wage in Macedonia could contribute 
to decrease the gender wage gap by up to 23 percent. 
Nevertheless, in order to significantly improve the wage 
gap, a rather high minimum wage may be required, 
which may contribute to reductions in employment. 
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  This paper relies on simple framework to understand the gender wage gap in 
Macedonia and then simulates how the gender wage gap would behave after the 
introduction of a minimum wage.    
  A recent labor market assessment conducted in the country by the World Bank 
(Angel-Urdinola and Macias, 2008) indicates that female labor force participation in 
Macedonia (at 49%) is one of the lowest in the ECA region (and significantly lower than 
that of males, at 75%). The authors find that low labor force participation for women is 
mainly explained by very low participation rates among women with low levels of 
education. While there are cultural values affecting the choice of low-educated women to 
engage in domestic production, especially among women of Albanian origin, low market 
wages, high reservation wages, and harsh employment conditions seem to be important 
exclusion determinants influencing uneducated women to stay at home (CRPM, 2008). 
According to the law (Article 108 in the labor relations law of 2005), employers shall be 
obliged to pay equal salary to employees for equal work with equal responsibilities at the 
position, regardless of their gender. However, estimates in this paper indicate that a large 
wage gap exist between men and women that is not necessarily explained by labor 
segmentation (whereby women enter sectors offering lower-pay) or by differences in 
returns to education by gender, but more likely by discrimination (whereby men in 
similar sectors, with similar education, and doing similar jobs earn higher wages than 
their female counterparts).  
  Angel-Urdinola and Macias (2008) find that low labor mobility, especially among 
low-skilled women, strengthens the sense of “local” (and non-convergent) labor markets 
whereby differences in employment outcomes across regions are quite large. 
Nevertheless, workers – especially women – seem not to move from worse to better 
performing regions in order to seek better job opportunities. These combined factors are 
generally prevalent in labor markets where firms have monopsonistic power. The 
implication of this is that firms may be paying women workers below their marginal 
product of labor, which causes the supply of labor to be below that in a competitive 
setting (a feature that may be affecting women disproportionally). Indeed, in some 
regions in Macedonia, a large share of working women is employed by a few large textile 
companies. These women claim having to accept jobs with very precarious conditions (in 
terms in pay, safety, and working hours) due to lack of alternative employment 
opportunities (CRPM, 2008). 
  If indeed low-educated workers in Macedonia, especially women, face a 
monopsonistic market; standard economic theory would indicate that the introduction of 
a minimum wage above the monopolistic wage but below the competitive market wage 
would likely increase employment without causing additional unemployment (Aaronson 
et al., 2008; Kaas and Madden, 2008; Joshi and Paci, 1998). While the introduction of a 
minimum wage in the private sector has been a policy already considered in Macedonia, 
it has not been introduced.
1 This is because minimum wage policy is heavily influenced 
                                                 
1 Article 107 in the labor relations law specifies that an employee’s salary for carrying out full-time work 
may not be lower than the minimum salary determined by law and collective agreement. However, 
minimum wages are not enforced in the private sector and are currently set unilaterally by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Protection as benchmark to determine the salary grid for public servants. 
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remain competitive in the global textile market) and fears that the level of the minimum 
wage, once introduced, would tend to increase rapidly to the point that it may create 
negative effects in employment growth (Angel-Urdinola, 2008; Brown et al., 1982; 
Horrigan and Mincy, 1993; Machin and Manin, 1994; and Card and Ashenfelter, 1999). 
Furthermore, the introduction of a minimum wage in Macedonia, being it the country 
with the highest unemployment in Europe (at 36%), seems a risky move; especially at a 
time when the government is moving towards making its labor market more flexible by 
reducing labor costs and tax wedges (Leibfritz, 2008). On the other hand, Macedonia is 
the process to accession to the EU and thus looks to comply with the Lisbon Agenda, 
which targets female labor force participation rates of 60% for EU-member countries. As 
such, the introduction of a minimum wage as a tool to increase low wages and thus 
female labor supply – especially among low-skilled women – constitutes a policy option.    
This paper has two main contributions. First, it presents a new – albeit simple –
framework that decomposes the wage gap into three factors: (i) a wage level factor, that 
measures the extent to which the gender gap is driven by differences in wage levels 
among low-skilled workers of opposite gender;  (ii) a skills endowment factor, that 
quantifies the extent to which the gender wage gap is driven because the share of high-
skilled workers differs by gender; and (iii) a returns to education factor, that measures the 
extent to which the gender gap is driven by differences in returns to education by gender. 
Second, the paper presents simple set of simulations that suggest that the introduction of 
a minimum wage could contribute to a decrease in the gender wage gap of up to 23%. 
The intuition of this result is very simple: low-skilled women earn much less than low-
skilled men, despite rather low segmentation and higher returns to education. A simple 
Oaxaca decomposition indicates that most of the wage gap among low-educated workers 
is due to unexplained factors (generally associated with discrimination; among other 
unobservable factors). The introduction of a minimum wage will likely be more binding 
for low-skilled/low-pay female workers and thus would contribute to increase their wages 
relative to those of males. However, these results should be treated with care. In 
particular, results in this paper indicate that in order to obtain a reduction in the wage gap 
that is statistically significant, a rather high level of the minimum wage (close the median 
wage) may be needed. A high minimum wage (set above the market-clearing price of 
labor) could lead employers to move back along their demand curves, causing a reduction 
in employment. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and presents 
simple descriptive statistics to quantify labor market segregation and discrimination. 
Section 3 presents a simple decomposition, which serves as a descriptive tool to analyze 
the gender wage gap. Section 4 discusses the results of the decomposition and quantifies 
(through simulations) the effects of introducing a minimum wage in the wage gap. A 
brief conclusion follows.      
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2.   Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This paper uses data for year 2006 from the national Labor Force Survey (LFS) 
conducted by the Macedonian State Statistical Office (SSO). The Survey includes a 
rotational panel, whereby households are interviewed more than one time during a year. 
The sampling frame, based on the 2002 Census, is stratified, rotational, two stage random 
and nationally representative. The data contains basic information on demographics, 
education, and labor market outcomes for individuals 15 years old and plus. Our sample 
includes approximately 6,536 working men and 4,445 employees between 15 and 64 
years old. Due to the nature of the study, unpaid and self-employed workers are not 
included in the sample. About 77% of the sample is made of low-skilled workers, as 
defined as those with less than complete tertiary education. Most workers in the sample 
work in manufacturing (28%), wholesale (12%), public administrations (10%), and 
education/health/social services (16%); which constitute the largest industries providing 
employment in Macedonia. More detailed descriptive statistics by gender, age-group, 
region, education, and industry of employment are presented in Table 1.    
An interesting feature of the labor market in Macedonia is the existence of a large 
wage gap between men and women. Figure 1 plots the cumulative density function 
(CDF) of hourly wages for both men and women. The figure illustrates that the men’s 
CDF stochastically dominates that of women, suggesting that at all points of the wage 
distribution males earn higher wage rates than their female counterparts. On average, 
unconditional estimates indicate than men earn wages that are 25% higher than women.
2  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on population shares and wage rates by 
gender and education for all employees. An interesting result is that gender wage 
differentials between men and women are large, especially among low-skilled workers in 
the private sector. A simple Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973) indicates that only 
17.4% of the gender gap among low-skilled workers is explained by differences in 
endowments between men and women while the remaining 82.6% of the gap is 
unexplained; which is generally attributed to the existence of discrimination (and/or other 
unobservable factors) in the labor market.  
Large gender wage gaps among less skilled workers could be explained by labor 
market segregation (Becker, 1971; Bergman, 1974; Johnson and Stafford, 1998) to the 
extent that women are more likely to work in low-pay sectors than men. Table 3 provides 
simple descriptive statistics on wage differentials and gender segregation by industry of 
employment. Results in Table 3 indicate that while there is some gender segregation in 
Macedonia – with men (women) being more segregated in the manufacturing and 
construction (education/heath/and social services) – overall segregation is not high. 
Indeed, the index of dissimilarity (one of the most used statistic for segmentation) by 
                                                 
2 Similar results using a standard Mincer equation on the natural logarithm hourly wages – controlling for 
gender, age, age squared, education, region, and industry of employment and other interaction terms 
between a gender dummy and education categories – indicate that the gender gender wage gap for 
employees is about 27.3%. These results are available upon request. Also refer to Angel-Urdinola and 
Macias (2008) for similar estimates.  
  4industry is only at 0.33.
3 Results indicate that the gender wage gap is quite high in 
segregated industries such as manufacturing and construction (at 32% and 58% 
respectively), as well as in non-segregated industries such as wholesale, hotels/ 
restaurants, and agriculture (oscillating between 15 and 56%). Finally, the gender wage 
gap is rather small (5 to 7%) among employees working in utilities (electricity, water, and 
gas) and transport and communications, both which are generally men-segregated 
industries. The aforementioned results indicate a rather weak correlation between gender 
segregation and the gender wage gap in Macedonia.  
 
3.  A Framework to Decompose the Gender Wage Gap  
 
This section presents a new – albeit simple – framework that decomposes the 
wage gap into three factors: (i) a wage factor, that measures the extent to which the 
gender gap exists because wages among low-skilled women are below those of low-
skilled men; (ii) a segmentation factor, that quantifies the extent to which the wage gap 
exists because the share of high-skilled workers differ by gender; and (iii) a returns to 
education factor, that measures the extent to which the gender gap exists due to 
differences by gender in returns to education. 
The workforce is made up low-skilled (L) and high-skilled (H) workers that can 
be male (M) or female (F). Let i = {H,L} and  j=(M,F}. Let   denote the share of 
workers by gender where  and let   denotes the share of workers by skill level 
where . The share of workers according to their gender and skill level is denoted 
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Let   denote the average wage rate for individuals with skills i and gender j; 
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Let’s denote the average wage in the labor market as: 
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3 The index is a measure from 0 to 1, where the higher the number, the more segregated the two groups are. 
The formula for computing the Index of Dissimilarity by industry is  ) ( ) ( 5 . 0 F F M M D i i − × =  where M 
(F) is the male (female) population of employees and Mi (Fi) is the male (female) population of employees 
in industry i.  
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calculate the average wage rate by gender 
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Equation (4) indicates that the average wage by gender is equal to the average 
wage of their low-skilled workers times a “high-skills premium factor” (normally greater 
than one) that depends on the returns to high skill labor, rj, and on the share of high-
skilled workers in the labor market, denoted by j
H
j S s . The share of high-skilled 
workers is our proxi for labor market segmentation according to the worker’s skills level.  
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Equation (6) decomposes the gender wage gap into three main factors:  
 
1.  Wage level of low-skilled workers: proxied by  W w
L
j  
2.  Segmentation: share of high-skilled workers by gender, proxied by   j
H
j S s  
3.  Returns to education: proxied by rj: 
 
The decomposition presented by equation (6) is useful to simulate changes in the 
wage gap due to policies that affect the wage level of low-skilled workers relative to the 
population and labor market segmentation (through investments on education, for 
instance). Within the proposed framework, returns to education by gender as given by the 
labor market.  
  Note that equation (6) could have been written using the wages of high-skilled 
workers as basis for the analysis. The choice of writing equation (6) in terms of the wages 
of low-skilled workers is rather opportunistic as it provides an advantage for analyzing 
changes in the wage level the low-skilled workers after the introduction of a minimum 
wage.  
To simulate the effect of the introduction of the minimum wage, we assume full 
compliance so that all workers earning below or at the minimum wage would earn at the 
minimum wage after its introduction, so that:  
 
  6MW w
c
ij =   if  ,     (7)  MW wij ≤
 
where c denotes the counterfactual wage of worker of level of skills i and gender j after 
the introduction of a minimum wage. Simulations re-calculate the “counterfactual” wage 
gap using the new level of individual wages as specified by equation (7). While full 
compliance is a rather hard assumption, in practice is rarely achieved. As a consequence, 
the results of the simulations presented here are likely to overestimate the impact of 




This section analyzes the gender wage gap in Macedonia based on the framework 
presented in section 3 and then simulates the effect of introduction of a minimum wage in 
the gender wage gap. Table 4 provides the results of the decomposition. The first row in 
Table 4 presents the average wage for low-skilled employees (by gender) as a proportion 
of the average wage. A value 1.03 for low-skilled males indicates that this group earns 
wage rates that are 3% above average. The same value is at 0.71 for females, suggesting 
that this group earns 20% lower wage rates than average. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 
indicate that this same feature occurs among employees in the private and non-private 
sectors. 
4 
The second row in Table 4 presents the share of high-skilled workers by gender. 
As expected, the share of high-skill workers in the non-private sector is larger than in the 
private sector (this is probably driven by the fact that workers in the public sector tend to 
be more educated). Interestingly, the share of high-skilled employees is higher among 
women (19% among women vs. 28% among men), especially in the non-private sector 
(28% among women vs. 44% among men).  
The third row in Table 4 quantifies the returns to education of high vs. low-skilled 
workers by gender. Results indicate that female employees display higher returns to 
education than male employees, especially in the non-private sector: wages of high-
skilled males (females) are 38% (71%) higher than those of low-skilled males (females).  
The fourth row in Table 4 display a “high-skills premium factor”, based on both 
education endowments and returns. Results indicate that this factor is generally higher for 
women (1.20 vs. 1.07 for men), mainly in the non-private sector (1.26 vs. 1.14 for men).
5  
By multiplying the values in column (1) times the values in column (4) we get a 
number – call it a gender factor. The gender wage gap can be calculated as the male 
factor minus the female factor. For male employees, the factor equals 1.10 (the higher the 
number the better). The factor for women equals 0.85. The value of the factor for men 
(1.10) minus the value of the factor for women (0.85) equals to the wage gap (0.25 or 
25%). Results of the decomposition indicate important differences between private and 
non-private employees. In particular, among private employees the advantages in wage 
levels enjoyed by low-skilled men over low-skilled women are offset by advantages 
                                                 
4 The choice of doing independent analysis for the private vs. non-private sector is not innocuous. Angel-
Urdinola and Macias (2008) find important differences in earning by gender and in returns to education in 
the private vs. non-public sectors.  
5 Women in Macedonia with higher levels of education are more likely to participate in the labor market 
(Angel-Urdinola and Macias, 2008).   
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endowment of high-skilled workers. As a result, the wage gap in the non-private sector is 
only at 6.3%. 
A nice feature of the decomposition is that it helps provide some further insight as 
to what are the main drivers of the wage gap. In this case, most of the gender wage gap is 
explained by large disadvantages in wage levels for low-skilled working women. 
Nevertheless, the decomposition is silent about the reason for such differences. As such, 
it should be used only as a descriptive tool.  
To recapitulate, results in Table 4 indicate that the gender wage gap (at 25%) is 
mainly explained by very low wage rates among low-skilled women as compared to the 
average wage rates – a disadvantage that is not evident among low-skilled men –. This 
phenomenon dominates other advantages displayed by female employees, such as higher 
returns to education and a larger endowment of high-skilled labor. Results are mainly 
driven by what occurs in the private sector. In the non-private sector, the gender wage 
gap is low (at 6.3%) despite the fact that low-skilled men still earn higher wages than 
low-skilled women. This occurs because men’s advantages are offset because women’s 
higher returns to education and endowments of high-skilled labor.   
Finally, Table 5 presents a series of simulations of how the gender wage gap 
would change with the introduction of a minimum wage. For simulations, a level of the 
minimum wage between 0.6 and 1 median wage (this is, between 30 and 50 Dinars per 
hour) is used. This is a range of the minimum wage level that is common in developing 
economies (Maloney and Nuñez, 2006).  
As illustrated in Table 5, a low level of a minimum wage (equivalent to 30 Dinars 
per hour) would not have much of an effect in the gender wage gap. However, results 
indicate that the introduction of a minimum wage between 40 and 50 Dinars per hour 
could contribute to a decrease in the gender wage gap of 15 to 23%. The intuition of this 
result is very simple: as discussed before, low-skilled women earn much less than low-
skilled men, despite women displaying higher human capital endowments and returns to 
education. As such, a minimum wage is likely to become more binding for low-skilled 
women than for low-skilled men and thereby likely to improve the wage level of low-
skilled women much more than it would for low-skilled men. However, in order to get a 
significant improvement in the wage level of low-skilled women, a rather high level of a 




Minimum wage policy poses a traditional trade-off. Raising the minimum wage 
allows for the possibility of increasing the earnings of workers at the lower tail of the 
wage distribution by more than average and thus promoting positive effects in labor 
supply, especially among low-skilled workers. However, a minimum wage set above the 
market-clearing price of labor will lead employers to move back along their demand 
curves, causing a reduction in employment. Evidence of imperfect competition in 
Macedonia (due to high levels of discrimination and low mobility) leads to the hypothesis 
that firms may be paying workers, and especially low-skilled women, below their 
marginal product of labor, which causes their supply of labor to be below that in a 
competitive setting. If so, the introduction of a minimum wage at or below the 
  8competitive market wage would likely increase the overall level of employment. Results 
in this paper indicate that a large wage gap between male and female employees exists, 
mainly in the private sector, due to the fact that low-skilled males earn wages that are  
higher that those of low-skilled women; despite little labor occupational segregation and 
despite the fact that women display higher human capital indicators. The introduction of a 
minimum wage between 40 and 50 Denars per hour would contribute to a decrease in the 
gender wage gap of between 15 and 23%. This occurs because introducing a minimum 
wage is likely to be more binding for low-skilled women than for low-skilled men and 
thereby likely to improve the wage level of low-skilled women by more than it would 
among low-skilled men. However, in order to get a significant improvement in the wage 
level of low-skilled women, a rather high minimum wage (close to the median wage) 
would need to be introduced. As such, while the introduction of a minimum wage may 
likely contribute to increase the wages of low-educated women and their levels of 
participation in the labor market; it may also contribute adversely to employment. The 
employment effects of minimum wage policy should be treated and assessed with 
particular care in Macedonia given its very low employment – and high unemployment – 
rates.   
Besides minimum wage policy, other policies aimed at strengthening market 
competition and at improving women’s job conditions and wages should be explored.  
Promoting higher wages for low-skilled women workers is likely to boost their 
participation, reduce the gender wage gap, and eventually contribute to poverty reduction 
(Angel-Urdinola and Wodon, 2006). Finally, the question of whether or not Macedonia 
has regional markets with monopsony power needs further testing, and more research 
aimed to understand the demand-side of the labor market in the country should be 
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  10Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the sample [employed working age population] 
 Male  Female  All 
Employment Rates  48.30  30.80  39.60 
  Employed Individuals 
Sample size  6,536  4,445  10,981 
Weighted  sample  240,956 162,608 403,564 
Age Group     
%  15-24  7.00 6.55 6.73 
% 25-34  25.09  25.41  25.28 
% 35-54  60.26  57.43  58.57 
% 55-64  7.65  10.61  9.41 
Education     
% Low Skill  80.43  71.27  76.74 
% High Skill*  19.57  28.73  23.26 
Region      
% Skopje  27.28  32.26  29.29 
% Bitola  11.59  12.54  11.97 
%  Veles  8.16 7.89 8.05 
%  Kumanovo  6.60 5.49 6.15 
% Ohrid  11.08  7.48  9.63 
% Strumika  9.23  11.63  10.19 
%  Tetovo  15.15 7.30 11.98 
% Shtip  10.91  15.42  12.73 
Industry     
%  Agriculture/mining/fishing  5.38 1.97 4.00 
% Manufacturing  24.04  34.61  28.30 
%  Elec/Gas/Water  5.69 1.39 3.95 
% Construction  12.73  1.81  8.33 
% Wholesale/retail  11.11  12.60  11.71 
%  Hotels/Restaurants  3.92 3.15 3.61 
%  Transport/communication  7.92 2.58 5.77 
% Fin & Real State Svs.  3.63  6.05  4.60 
% Public Admin.  11.46  7.21  9.75 
% Education/health/Social Work  9.47  25.15  15.79 
%  Other  services  4.66 3.48 4.19 
Ownership     
%  Private  50.6 54.2 52.1 
% Non private**  49.4  45.8  47.9 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author’s estimates using 2006 Macedonia LFS data. * High-skill workers are defined as those with 
at least complete higher education (university and above). ** Includes public and semi-private companies 
such as utilities (gas, water, and electricity).   
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Table 2: Average wage rates (in Dinars per hour) and population shares by gender 
and level of education.  
















Gender        
Male    59% 72.2 55% 73.9 61% 70.5 
Females    41% 56.0 45% 47.5 39% 66.2 
Education        
High-skilled    23% 86.4 12% 81.8 34% 88.1 
Low-skilled    77% 59.3 88% 59.4 66% 58.9 
Gender and Education              
Low-skilled  females  30% 46.8 39% 43.8 22% 52.5 
Low-skilled  males  47% 67.3 49% 71.5 44% 62.0 
High-skilled  females  11% 80.1  6%  70.2 17% 83.7 
High-skilled  males  11% 92.6  6%  93.6 17% 92.5 
Total  100% 65.5 100% 62.1 100% 68.9 
Source: Author’s estimates using 2006 Macedonia LFS data. * High-skill workers are defined as those with 
at least complete higher education (university and above). 
 
 
Table 3: Unconditional gender wage gap and occupational segregation [low-skilled 
workers only] 













| Mi/M –  




(3) / (4) 
Agriculture/mining/fishing  6.01 2.33 65.3 40.5  0.04  41.2% 
Manufacturing 26.66  44.41  55.5  40.2  0.18  32.0% 
Elec/Gas/Water  5.71 1.55 78.2 72.3  0.04  7.6% 
Construction  14.87 1.76 101.3 44.6  0.13  58.5% 
Wholesale/retail 12.24  14.57  55.9  48.0  0.02  15.2% 
Hotels/Restaurants  4.61 4.25 95.8 51.5  0.00  55.7% 
Transport/communication  8.78 2.32 62.6 67.1  0.06  -7.1% 
Fin & Real State Svs.  2.48  4.22  65.8  71.2  0.02  -7.9% 
Public  Admin.  9.65 5.16 68.0 55.9  0.04  18.7% 
Educ./health/Social Work  4.64  16.13  52.9  50.3  0.11  5.0% 
Other  services  4.35 3.31 60.9 59.2  0.01  2.9% 
Index of segregation         0.33   
Source: Author’s estimates using 2006 Macedonia LFS data. The formula for computing the Index of 
Dissimilarity by industry is:  ) ( ) ( 5 . 0 F F M M D i i − × =  where M (F) is the male (female) population of 
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Table 4: Results of the decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap 
  All Employees 
(1) 




  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
(1)  W w
L
j   1.03 0.71 1.15 0.71 0.90 0.76 
(2)  j
H
j S s   0.19 0.28 0.11 0.14 0.28 0.44 
















1.07 1.20 1.03 1.08 1.14 1.26 
(1)  x  (4)  1.10 0.85 1.19 0.76 1.02 0.96 
Wage Gap  24.8%  42.5%  6.3% 
Sample  Size  N  6,536 4,445 3,086 2,348 3,264 2,037 
Weighted  N  240,956  162,608  115,770 86,168 119,027 74,406 
Source: Author’s estimates using 2006 Macedonia LFS data. *Includes public and semi-private companies 
such as utilities (gas, water, and electricity).   
 
 
Table 5: Simulations of changes in the Gender Wage Gap after the introduction of a 
minimum wage [all employees] 
  MW=30 Dinars/hours 
(0.6 the median wage) 
 
MW=40 Dinars/hours 





  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
(1)  W w
L
j   1.03 0.72 1.03 0.76 1.02 0.79 
(2)  j
H
j S s   1.07 1.19 1.06 1.15 1.05 1.12 
















0.37 0.69 0.31 0.53 0.28 0.44 
(1)  x  (4)  1.10 0.86 1.09 0.88 1.08 0.89 
Wage Gap  24.3  21.1%  19.0% 
% reduction in 
the Wage Gap 
2% 15%  23% 
Source: Author’s estimates using 2006 Macedonia LFS data. *Includes public and semi-private companies 
such as utilities (gas, water, and electricity).   





























2 3 4 5 6 7
lhwage
c.d.f. of  female  c.d.f. of  male 
 
Source: World Author’s estimates using 2006 Macedonia LFS data.  
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